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Paul D. Carrington** 
The new edition of Appellate Courts: Structures, 
Functions, Processes and Personnel was produced to serve law 
students in a course on Appeals. It is well done. The course 
should be in the curriculum of every law school that hopes not 
only to supply law clerks, staff attorneys for appellate courts, or 
(most especially) appellate judges, but also leaders of the 
organized bar and top government lawyers who share 
responsibility for the laws governing appellate courts and their 
proceedings. Better knowledge of its subject might even help a 
lawyer win a case every now and then. 
 
*See Appellate Courts: Structures, Functions, Processes, and Personnel (Daniel J. Meador, 
Thomas E, Baker, & Joan E. Steinman eds., 2d ed., Lexis-Nexis 2006) [hereinafter the 
Second Edition]. 
** Professor of Law, Duke University. As noted in the text of this review, I was a nominal 
co-editor of the first edition of this book. Professor Meador and I have been friends for 
forty years, sometimes co-authors, and sometimes allies in endeavors at judicial law 
reform. I am also sometimes amiably quoted in the book. I have, however, had no role 
whatever in the development of this edition. In the spring of 2006, I for the first time taught 
a course on Appeals as the second to Professor Michael Tigar, who is, among other 
distinctions, the co-author of the definitive text on the subject. Michael E. Tigar & Jane B. 
Tigar, Federal Appeals: Jurisdiction and Practice (3d ed., West Group 1999). Jena Levin 
provided valuable assistance to preparing this review. 
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Many of the issues presented in this book are seldom 
noticed by many law teachers or their students.1 Some of these 
are narrowly technical in nature. For example, who teaches that 
the time for appeal is “jurisdictional” in the sense that no court 
may, even for good cause, grant an extension? Many have 
protested this excessive rigidity;2 yet the Supreme Court applied 
it again in 2007 to bar an appeal from a habeas denial that was 
filed two days late but before the date specified by the district 
judge.3 The judge simply misread the calendar by three days, 
and no one representing the state objected, perhaps because its 
lawyers shared the appellant’s counsel’s failure to notice the 
error. Even a well-educated and reasonably careful lawyer could 
have forfeited his clients’ rights in such circumstances. And it is 
hard to see what harm was done to the state by giving the 
prisoner a couple of extra days to appeal. 
The brutal result in Bowles was based on the conclusory 
declaration that the time for appeal has long been held to be 
“jurisdictional” and therefore cannot be extended for any 
reason.4 Five Justices disowned their power to “create equitable 
exceptions,”5 i.e., to do justice even when the mistake was made 
by a federal district judge and counsel for the state made no 
objection to the extra days. As the dissenters observed, the 
appellant’s appointed counsel: 
probably just trusted that the date given was correct, and 
there was nothing unreasonable in so trusting. The other 
 
 1. An exception was the Duke Law students who in 1983 joined in writing a thorough, 
careful Restatement of the Law of Federal Appellate Jurisdiction as a contribution to a 
double issue of Law and Contemporary Problems. They sought to clarify an arcane subject 
and won the approval of a conference of eminent federal appellate judges, some of whom 
contributed essays to the issue. See Civil Appellate Jurisdiction, 47-2 & 47-3 Law & 
Contemp. Prob. (1984). I take this occasion to salute their memorable efforts. Alas, the 
complexity of the problems they addressed assured that no simple solutions could be 
provided. 
 2. The Second Edition’s editors at page 161 cite four critics of the absolute rule 
invoked by the Court: this reviewer, and Professors Edward Cooper, Maurice Rosenberg, 
and Mark Hall. I know of no published defense of it. 
 3. Bowles v. Russell, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007). 
 4. Id. at 2362, 2366 (noting that the Court has “long and repeatedly held that the time 
limits for filing a notice of appeal are jurisdictional in nature,” and announcing that 
“[t]oday we make clear that the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a 
jurisdictional requirement”). This doctrine is considered critically on pages 158-161 of the 
Second Edition. 
 5. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2366. 
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side let the order pass without objection, either not caring 
enough to make a fuss or not even noticing the discrepancy; 
the mistake of a few days was probably not enough to ring 
the alarm bell to send either lawyer to his copy of the 
federal rules and then off to the courthouse to check the 
docket.6 
One cannot say with certainty that if they had taken a law-school 
course designed around this book, the majority of the Court 
would have reached a more sensible result, but surely it is an 
aim of professional education to demean such disgraceful 
nonsense as that expressed in the majority opinion. 
The course and the book are, however, about much more 
than such legal technicalities. The book is a critical assessment 
of the cultural and institutional roles of appellate courts. Few 
lawyers, even those appointed or elected to an appellate bench, 
or who serve in high government offices, have ever thought 
critically about many of the issues posed. The chief thing 
American lawyers learn in law school about appellate courts is 
that they make law. And perhaps the primary motive of those 
lawyers seeking appellate judgeships is an ambition to exercise 
that lawmaking power. But this volume goes beyond the basics 
to raise the fundamental questions that even moot court practice 
seldom raises: Who are these persons I address when making an 
argument as counsel? What is their role in the legal system? 
What claims have a litigant or his counsel to their attention? 
What claim has the trial judge under review to a measure of 
deference? The editors aptly quote Judge Dickson Phillips’s 
observation that the answers to these questions are “surprisingly 
unsystematic and relatively obscure.”7 
Given this obscurity and the fixation of law schools on the 
lawmaking function of appellate courts, it is unsurprising that 
appellate judges tend to delegate to law clerks and staff 
attorneys the onerous and less celebrated or less rewarding work 
that comes with the bulk of the appeals, and to save for 
themselves opportunities to express views on the public policies 
 
 6. Id. at 2372 (footnote omitted) (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., 
dissenting). 
 7. Second Edition at 222 (quoting J. Dickson Phillips, Jr., The Appellate Review 
Function: Scope of Review, 47-2 L. & Contemp. Prob. 1 (1984)). And see Chad M. 
Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 57 Vand. 
L. Rev. 437 (2004). 
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of the day in ever longer but fewer published opinions. In the 
federal system, most lawyers are not heard to speak at oral 
argument, so the judges responsible for deciding their cases need 
neither be seen nor demonstrate their familiarity with the issues 
presented. Indeed, many, many appeals are decided by 
memoranda written by staff attorneys subject to nominal 
oversight by those appointed by the President and confirmed by 
the Senate to assure the correctness of the actions of United 
States courts. 
The tendency of judges to delegate is magnified in the 
federal courts by the reality that the appetite for lawmaking 
pervades the federal judiciary. Even the trial judges subject to 
the appellate courts’ review have also acquired large staffs to 
which they delegate the tasks that seem humdrum and unworthy 
of their full attention. That tendency is so visible that Judge 
Patrick Higginbotham has questioned why we still call them 
“trial judges” if they no longer conduct trials.8 District Judge 
Brock Hornby explains that having less to do in the courtroom, 
he is using his law clerks to write long legal opinions9 because 
the appellate courts are increasingly applying their work model 
to the trial judges.10 And at the other end of the hierarchy the 
Supreme Court has done much the same, delegating its less 
exciting duties to staff and to lower courts so that the Justices 
can enjoy writing fewer but longer opinions. Among the judicial 
duties often delegated by the Supreme Court to lower courts is 
responsibility for the legal correctness of the dispositions in 
cases it considers when performing its more exhilarating 
 
 8. Patrick E. Higginbotham, So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts? 55 S.M.U. L. 
Rev. 1405 (2002). 
 9. D. Brock Hornby, Stepping Down, 8 J. App. Prac. & Process 265, 269-70 (2006) 
(“I now tell law clerks when I hire them that their experience will be far more like that of 
appellate clerks than it would have been in 1990, and that they will spend much more time 
studying written briefs, listening to oral arguments, and writing opinions than struggling 
with jury instructions and evidentiary rulings in the courtroom. Of course, when I tell them 
this, I am talking about my own professional worklife.”). He rightly attributes the 
transformation of roles to Supreme Court opinions re-writing Rule 56 to enlarge the use of 
summary judgments. Id. at 268 n. 2 See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: 
Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our 
Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments? 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962 (2003)). And the 
Supreme Court in 2007 further extended summary judgment practice to magnify this effect. 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). 
 10. Hornby, supra n. 10, at 269. 
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legislative function. Consider then the question: “Why do we 
still call them appellate judges—or Justices—if their primary 
task is to proclaim law as legislators?11 
Yes, of course, appellate courts make law. But we do have 
other institutions to provide that service. The indispensable task 
of the appellate court is to correct error, or perhaps more 
precisely, to convince the parties and their counsel that the 
possibility of incorrect application of the law has been seriously 
considered by judges of rank and security, and to remind trial 
judges that they are indeed confined by the law in the choices 
that they may make in response to overtures from parties. 
Congressman David Culberson, who in 1891 led the initiative to 
establish the United States Courts of Appeals, proclaimed his 
purpose as the constraint of the “kingly power” of federal trial 
judges who were then too numerous and too self-indulgent to be 
corrected by one Supreme Court.12 If the newly commissioned 
intermediate appellate judges were to make law, that effort was 
to be merely incidental to their primary task of making the trial 
judges visibly accountable for their fidelity to controlling law. 
Indeed, that same expectation was framed by the common 
law tradition of judicial lawmaking, which was a secondary and 
often unnoticed effect of decisions reviewing rulings by first 
instance judges for correctness as enforcements of law. The laws 
made by early appellate judges were traditionally expressed only 
in brief oral explanations of their decisions that might be 
synthesized by a reporter whose published report might or might 
not be attended by lawyers and judges in later cases. As 
Tennyson explained, law made by common law judges was a 
“wilderness of single instances.”13 
Congressman Culberson surely had it right that federal 
district courts need to be held to account for their use of the 
great powers vested in them. This is, I suggest, with respect to 
 
 11. Judge Posner has identified the Supreme Court of the United States as not a court, 
but a superlegislature. Richard D. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 
31, 35 (2005) (pointing out that “it is no longer feasible for the Court to control the lower 
courts by means of narrow, case-by-case determinations—the patient, incremental method 
of the common law,” and that it “must perforce act legislatively”). 
 12. 21 Cong. Rec. 3403 (1890). 
 13. Alfred, Lord Tennyson, Aylmer’s Field, lines 435-439, in The Poetical Works of 
Tennyson 241, 246 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1974) (reprint of 1898 edition) (also available at 
http://classiclit.about.com/library/bl-etexts/atennyson/bl-aten-aylmer.htm). 
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civil matters, even more true in our day than in his.14 Our trial 
courts increasingly resemble bureaucracies, as their staffs have 
been enlarged with a growing number of magistrate judges, 
bankruptcy judges, court-annexed arbitrators, special masters, 
law clerks, and mediators.15 Recent reforms of civil procedure in 
courts of first instance have been in the direction of enlarging 
the power and discretion of the trial judge16 in managing a cadre 
of assistants, causing him or her increasingly to resemble the 
awesome Chancellors of old, who did in reality exercise royal 
power.17 
If American law is to play the traditional and expected role 
of holding together a vast, diverse, and conflicted population by 
assuring adequately shared trust in law and its institutions, 
litigants must perceive that they are getting the personal 
attention of judges that is the heart of the Due Process 
guaranteed by state and federal constitutions. Judges sitting on 
appellate benches, and their subordinates, must therefore give 
serious attention to appellate procedures and structures 
established to ensure the measures of accountability and 
transparency required to assure litigants, and the public, that the 
job is being done, and being done by those whose job it is to do 
it. 
Seldom is attention given in the curricula of most American 
law schools to the subject of the law governing the appellate 
process. Law professors are, like the future judges they instruct, 
universally fascinated with the substantive politics of the law 
 
 14. There was no right to appeal a criminal conviction in a federal court until 1888. It 
was at first limited to capital cases, but was extended to all convictions by the 1891 Act. 
And it would be many decades before the right to counsel was respected. See generally 
Lester Bernhardt Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America (Little, Brown 1959). 
 15. This growth was first approved by Congress in the Federal Magistrates Act of 
1968, 82 Stat. 1108, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-39. Cf. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon 
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). Justices White, Powell, and Burger found the majority 
decision upholding the statute to have read Article III out of the Constitution. Id. at 113 
(White, J., Burger, C.J., & Powell, J., dissenting). 
 16. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 
1994 Wis. L. Rev. 631; Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury 
Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1996). 
 17. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 909 (1987); Amalia D. 
Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for 
an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 1181 (2005); Jonathan T. Molot, An 
Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 Yale L. J. 27 (2003). 
BOOK REVIEW 3.DOC 1/31/2008 1:49 PM 
BOOK REVIEW—THE ROLE OF THE APPELLATE COURTS 107 
that appellate judges make, but very few are seriously attentive 
to the complexities of the institutional duties and responsibilities 
that may be neglected or misused by the empowered judiciary. 
Those who teach civil or criminal procedure seldom give more 
than glancing attention to issues of appellate jurisdiction, or the 
appropriate standards of review, or the institutional need for 
transparency, or even to what might be loosely described as 
appellate due process. 
Daniel Meador, the senior editor of this book, invented the 
course for which it is designed. He aimed to correct that 
curricular failing and cause more lawyers, judges, and 
lawmakers to be informed of the public interest in the structure 
and conduct of appellate courts. The value of the course and the 
importance of the book may be more apparent in light of the 
events leading to its development. 
Professor Meador’s first edition reflected his major role in 
the work of the Advisory Council on Appellate Justice. That 
group was summoned in the 1970s by the Federal Judicial 
Center and its leader, Judge Alfred P. Murrah, to consider 
proposed reforms in appellate procedure and in the structure of 
federal appellate courts, and, incidentally, in state appellate 
courts as well. The climax of the Council’s work was a large 
national conference called to San Diego in 1975 to consider the 
thoughts of the Council; the National Center for State Courts 
joined in its sponsorship. Conferees were presented with three 
studies on which they were invited to reflect. One study had 
been conducted by the American Bar Foundation under the 
direction of this reviewer,18 another by a commission appointed 
by the Supreme Court and led by Professor Paul Freund,19 and a 
third by a commission created by the Senate Judiciary 
 
 18. American Bar Foundation, Accommodating the Workload of the United States 
Courts of Appeals (Am. Bar Found. 1968); this report was later elaborated upon by the 
study’s director. See Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The 
Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 542 (1969). 
 19. Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, Report, 57 F. R. D. 573 (1972); 
this study favored a court with jurisdiction to shield the Court from the task of deciding 
certiorari petitions. Members of the Court were offended by the suggested restraint on the 
power of the Justices to decide what cases they choose to decide. For reflections, see Philip 
B. Kurland, The Supreme Court and the Judicial Function (U. Chicago Press 1975); Doris 
Marie Provine, Case Selection in the United States Supreme Court (U. Chicago Press 
1980). 
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Committee and chaired by Senator Roman Hruska.20 These three 
studies were united in the view that reforms in the federal 
appellate structure and practice were overdue. 
That conference and its antecedents were responsive to 
growing caseloads requiring increasing numbers of judges in 
state as well as federal courts. In substantial measure, the 
growing caseloads were the result of reforms in criminal 
procedure and in the rights of prisoners to appellate and 
collateral review of convictions, and to decent conditions of 
imprisonment. Much of the new caseload was cases uninspiring 
to those assigned to hear and decide them. Many appeals were 
pro forma,21 and more than a few were advanced pro se. 
Memorable to the reviewer was an account of one appellate 
judge who described an appeal then recently heard that was 
primarily based on the noticed fact that the national flag was not 
on display in the courtroom in which the defendant was 
convicted, “and then counsel went on to his weaker arguments.” 
The lawyer making that argument may have been doing the best 
possible job to vindicate his client’s constitutional right to 
appellate review. Increasingly, oral arguments were denied; 
most appellate opinions were brief and often unpublished, but 
the others became longer, perhaps to give more orders to lower 
courts in the hope of reducing the need to correct their errors. 
And as the number of appellate judges increased, their 
statements of the law were declining in the weight of their 
authority. While they differed in details, all three noted studies 
and the Advisory Council agreed that structural change was 
needed in the federal courts to assure that the appellate function 
could be more adequately performed. 
The work of the Council was later recorded in a book 
authored by Meador, this reviewer, and Maurice Rosenberg22 to 
record and explain the view prevailing among its members, who 
 
 20. Report of the Commission on the Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, 
61 A. B. A. J. 819 (1975). See also Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate 
System, Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195 
(1975). 
 21. In Anders v. Cal., 386 U.S. 738 (1967), the Court held that appointed counsel 
abandoning an appeal must file a brief explaining the absence of a viable appellate 
argument. 
 22. Professor Rosenberg, now deceased, was then a professor at the Columbia Law 
School. 
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were united in the view that a time for reforming the federal 
appellate courts had arrived. That book was published in 1976.23 
Professor Meador became an Assistant Attorney General in 
1977. Attorney General Griffin Bell, another member of the 
Advisory Council on Appellate Justice, commissioned him to 
initiate reforms in the structure of the federal judiciary. There 
were no direct results of his efforts, but they did lead to the 
creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982.24 Alas, that reform was 
not among those proposed by the American Bar Foundation 
group, the Supreme Court’s Freund committee, or the Senate’s 
Hruska commission. That new court was given exclusive 
jurisdiction over appeals in certain intellectual property cases 
notwithstanding cautions against specialized appellate 
judgeships25 and the country’s unfavorable experience with the 
Commerce Court.26 Perhaps the Federal Circuit has not fallen 
into the same trap or maybe it has; experts on intellectual 
property law might perceive that the court strongly favors 
property rights at the expense of the public domain. If there are 
interest groups seeking to influence the selection of judges to be 
appointed to that court, it is surely those enriched by the 
expansion of intellectual property rights, and not those who 
merely wish for less costly access to ideas and art. 
In 1979, Professor Meador returned from the Department 
of Justice to the University of Virginia Law School. He then 
created the law school course on Appeals and developed the first 
 
 23. See Paul D. Carrington, Daniel J. Meador & Maurice Rosenburg, Justice on Appeal 
(West Pub. Co. 1976) [hereinafter Justice on Appeal]. The recommendations of the 
Advisory Council appear on pages 254-255. The authors’ more elaborate recommendations 
appear on pages 225-231. 
 24. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, P.L. 97-164. The portions of the Act 
relevant to this discussion are now codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (available at http:uscode 
.house.gov). 
 25. Indeed, Meador and his co-authors considered the problem and proposed that a 
court such as the Federal Circuit, if established, should be served by judges rotating to that 
court from the regional circuits. Justice on Appeal, supra n. 23, at 220. The purpose of such 
rotation would be to diminish the lawmaking role of the court and insulate the process of 
judicial selection from the influence of those having the greatest stake in intellectual 
property law. Id. 
 26. The Commerce Court was created by the Mann-Elkins Act, 36 Stat. 539 (1910), to 
review decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and abolished three years later, 
38 Stat. 208 (1913), because its judgeships so quickly became a major target of those with 
a stake in railroad politics. 
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edition of the book under review.27 At the same time, he 
instituted a graduate program for newly elected or appointed 
appellate judges whom he hoped, among other things, to 
acquaint with the issues giving rise to the percolating reformist 
agenda.28 While the first edition of the book reflected work that 
Meador had done with Maurice Rosenberg and myself, and 
incorporated some suggestions made by us, neither Rosenberg 
nor I was entirely comfortable with being identified as a co-
editor. Neither of us found occasion to teach the course from the 
first edition, and neither of us received royalties from its sale. It 
is thus Meador’s vision and Meador’s book that has been 
elegantly updated by the junior editors, Baker and Steinman. 
Except for the creation of the Federal Circuit, none of the 
reforms advanced by the three studies or by the Advisory 
Council has been seriously considered by Congress. Meanwhile, 
two more studies were conducted, one under the auspices of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States,29 and another 
commissioned by Congress and led by retired Justice Byron 
White, then assisted by Professor Meador.30 Their 
recommendations resemble those advanced in the three previous 
studies. There was also the 1994 work of Professor Baker,31 who 
had begun in 1987 publishing thoughtful reflections on the need 
for reform.32 Professors William Reynolds and William 
Richman joined the chorus about the same time.33 And then 
 
 27. Daniel J. Meador, Maurice Rosenberg & Paul D. Carrington, Appellate Courts: 
Structures, Functions, Processes and Personnel (Michie Co. 1994). 
 28. See Virginia Law, Master of Laws in the Judicial Process, http://www.law.virginia 
.edu/html/prospectives/judges/judges.htm (noting that the graduate program for judges was 
established in 1980, but has since been discontinued) (accessed Oct. 10, 2007; copy on file 
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). 
 29. Judith A. McKenna, Structural and Other Alternatives for the Federal Courts of 
Appeals (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1993). 
 30. Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, Final 
Report  (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1999), http://www.fjc.gov/library/fjc_catalog.nsf/autoframepage! 
openform&url=/library/fjc_catalog.nsf/DPublication!openform&parentunid=0B9620FF463
BF37285256CA300675A01. 
 31. Thomas E. Baker, Rationing Justice on Appeal—The Problems of the U.S. Courts 
of Appeals (West Pub. Co. 1994). 
 32. E.g. Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, The Need for A New National 
Court, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1400 (1987). 
 33. E.g. William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the 
New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 273 (1996); 
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came Professor Steinman to join the cause.34 But 
notwithstanding an almost universally shared opinion that the 
system was failing in both federal and state courts to serve the 
public need, no substantial proposal regarding the appellate 
structure has been seriously considered by Congress. To be sure, 
there were skeptics inclined to prefer the evolving system of 
federal appeals to the proposals for reform; Professor Arthur 
Hellman stands out as the leading academic voice resisting the 
clamor for reform.35 
In 2005, at the urging of Professor Meador, the American 
Academy of Appellate Lawyers staged a conference redolent of 
the 1975 event organized by the Advisory Council on Appellate 
Justice.36 The Academy, unlike the Advisory Council, had no 
agenda of reform, and I am aware of no reform initiatives that 
resulted from the event. As a participant, I spoke with many able 
appellate judges. I frequently heard the observation that all is 
well, that the infrequency of oral argument is insignificant 
because so many of the lawyers wishing to present arguments 
are simply not worth listening to. And I heard the explanation 
that judges and their staffs need to concentrate on polishing their 
published opinions because it is by the quality of those 
utterances that their professional careers will be judged by their 
peers and by posterity. It was also said that the creation of more 
judgeships would merely increase the difficulty of maintaining 
coherence. I have no doubt that there is some merit in each of 
these observations. 
But I hope even so that this book and the law school course 
it serves to organize will advance the cause of appellate court 
law reform. Judge Clement Haynsworth was entirely correct in 
his observation that “reform in the administration of justice is a 
fragile thing, easily wrecked by stout opposition from even a 
 
and see William M. Richman, An Argument on the Record for More Appellate Judgeships, 
1 J. App. Prac. & Process 37 (1999). 
 34. E.g. Joan M. Steinman, The Scope of Appellate Jurisdiction: Pendent Appellate 
Jurisdiction Before and After Swint, 49 Hastings L. J. 1337 (1998). 
 35. E.g, Arthur D. Hellman, The Proposed Intercircuit Tribunal: Do We Need It? Will 
It Work? 11 Hastings Const. L. Q. 375 (1984); Arthur D. Hellman, The Unkindest Cut: The 
White Commission Proposal to Restructure the Ninth Circuit, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 377 
(2000). 
 36. The Conference proceedings were published in Volume 8, Issue 1, of this Journal. 
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small handful or two of respected or influential persons,”37 for 
what is everyone’s business is no one’s special concern. And the 
Judicial Conference of the United States, like any fraternal 
organization, is almost incapable of seriously considering any 
scheme that diminishes the discretion or impairs the status of its 
members. Professor Hellman’s skepticism toward reform tends, 
then, to find a congenial audience among members of the 
judicial fraternity. And Professor Tigar has aptly quoted 
Chesterton’s dictum that judges “are not cruel. They just get 
used to things.”38 
On that account, it took a half century of agitation after 
observers first noticed the need for the Courts of Appeals before 
Congressman Culberson and Senator William Evarts at last 
secured enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1891. And that was 
before the Judiciary Act of 192239 established the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, an event leading to a major 
enlargement of the political power of the judicial fraternity. 
It is not merely the intermediate courts that are in need of 
serious reform. In 2005, Professor Meador and I joined an 
eminent group—something of a philosophic successor to the 
Advisory Council on Appellate Justice—that recommended term 
limits for Justices40 as a first step in providing Congressional 
checks and balances on an institution that, in our view, has 
become too big for its britches. As Judge Posner has observed, 
the Court has come to think of itself as a superlegislature41 
largely unconcerned with whether specific cases have been 
 
 37. Ltr. from Clement F. Haynsworth, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the 4th Cir., to Prof. A. 
Leo Levin, Exec. Dir., Commn. on Rev. of the Fed. Ct. App. Sys. (Apr. 30, 1975), in II 
Hearings before the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System 1327 
(1975). 
 38. Michael E. Tigar, A Review of Appellate Courts (2d ed. 2006), 2007 Fed Cts. L. 
Rev. 2 (July 2007), http://www.fclr.org/2007fedctslrev2.htm. 
 39. See An Act for the Appointment of an Additional Circuit Judge for the Fourth 
Judicial Circuit, for the Appointment of Additional District Judges for Certain Districts, 
Providing for an Annual Conference of Certain Judges, and for Other Purposes, 42 Stat. 
837 (1922). 
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decided with correct regard for the rights of parties. Its staff of 
law clerks, sitting as its certiorari panel, plays a large role in the 
selection of the few cases it agrees to decide, so that the Justices 
provide a model for lower court judges opting to delegate their 
scutwork to staff, and to limit their own chores to those that are 
more fun. 
While the editors of this second edition of Appellate Courts 
have devoted a brief chapter to the management of the Supreme 
Court, there is no reference to the scheme advanced by Meador, 
myself, and others in 2005, surely in part because the volume 
advancing that idea and numerous other proposals for reform 
had not been published when Appellate Courts went to press. 
But those teaching the course served by this book might do us 
the honor of considering the diverse proposals advanced in that 
volume. Also worthy of attention are two other recent books 
calling attention to the extraordinary and questionable role of the 
law clerks serving the Supreme Court Justices.42 
The editors of this new edition are of course fully aware of 
the impediments to reform. In their concluding remark, they do 
not neglect to quote Arthur Vanderbilt’s chestnut that “judicial 
law reform is no sport for the short-winded.” Given the present 
state of American politics, it will require acts of truly 
exceptional political courage to achieve even modest reforms to 
address the issues posed in this book. Might there be legislators 
willing and able to forsake the tasks of fund raising and securing 
earmarks long enough to address serious institutional problems 
of constitutional importance? Perhaps the best hope for 
reformers is a Supreme Court that continues to write lawmaking 
opinions evoking the sort of public rage that benign reforms 
might be expected to ease. Only time will tell. 
 
 
 
 
 42. Todd C. Peppers, Courtiers of the Marble Palace: The Rise and Influence of the 
Supreme Court Law Clerk (Stanford L. & Pol. 2006); Artemus Ward & David L. Weiden, 
Sorcerers’ Apprentices: 100 Years of Law Clerks at the United States Supreme Court 
(NYU Press 2006). 
